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Objectives. Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high 
degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance several researchers have argued 
that citizens’ attitudes toward paying taxes defined as tax morale helps to explain the high degree of 
tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box without discussing 
which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical  research 
that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Thus, this paper is unique in its examination 
of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, a 
choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using 
datasets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.  
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 Over the last few years, the question of why citizens pay taxes has attracted increased 
attention in the tax compliance literature. To answer this question, Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) developed a formal model that assumes the extent of tax evasion to be negatively 
correlated with the probability of detection and degree of punishment. However, this 
groundbreaking model has been widely criticized ( e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, 
McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Frey and Feld, 2002). A main point, which is connected to 
the empirical and experimental findings, is that these deterrence models predict far too little 
compliance and far too much tax evasion (for an overview, see Alm, 1999; Torgler, 2002). 
That is, in many countries, the level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax 
compliance. Moreover, a large gap exists between the effectively reported degree of risk 
aversion and the amount required to guarantee compliance. For the United States, the 
estimated Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is between 1 and 2, but only a value of 30 
would explain the observed compliance rate (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland, and 
Schulze, 1992). Similarly, in Switzerland, the relative risk aversion also varies between 1 and 
2, but a value of 30.75 would be necessary to reach the observed level of 76.52 percent tax 
compliance (Frey and Feld, 2002). Elffers (2000) points out that there is a long way before a 
person becomes a tax evader. Some researchers have argued that many individuals do not 
even think of tax evasion. Frey (1999) uses the word “ipsative possibility set” (p. 196) and 
shows that there are taxpayers who do not even search for ways to cheat at taxes. Long and 
Swinger (1991: 130) argue that some taxpayers are “simply predisposed not to evade.” 
Moreover, several experiments indicate that there are individuals who always comply (Alm, 
1999).   
To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that tax morale 
can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for an overview see Torgler, 2001). Tax 
morale, unlike tax evasion, measures not individual behavior but individual attitude. Tax 
morale—which is not a new notion but has received surprisingly little attention in the tax   3
compliance literature—can be defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in 
contributing to society by paying taxes. Preliminary tax morale research in the 1960s 
(Schmölders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969) tried to bridge economics and social psychology by 
emphasizing that economic phenomena should be analyzed from a perspective larger than the 
traditional neoclassical point of view (e.g., Lewis, 1979, 1982). Tax morale is also closely 
linked to what have been termed taxpayer ethics, “the norms of behaviour governing citizens 
as taxpayers in their relationship with the government” (Song and Yarbrough, 1978: 443). A 
later empirical analysis found that, compared to other variables, tax morale had the strongest 
significant impact on the size of the shadow economy (Weck, 1983). Torgler (2003a) also 
found that tax morale significantly reduced tax evasion. However, these two studies also 
treated tax morale as an exogenous residual. Thus, much extant research treats tax morale as a 
black box or residuum rather than analyzing the factors that shape or maintain it (Feld and 
Frey, 2002a). To empirically address this issue, this study focuses on tax morale as reflected 
by data from the World Values Survey (WVS 1995–1997) and the European Values Survey 
(1999–2000).  
Previous studies have pointed out that differences in compliance behavior across cultures 
are driven by differences in tax administration and citizen attitudes toward governments (e.g., 
Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan, 1995; Cummings et al., 2005; Alm and Torgler, 2006). However, 
by examining tax morale in three multicultural European countries, our analysis focuses rather 
on cultural and institutional differences within countries. Specifically, our dataset 
encompasses Switzerland, a land with strong direct democratic rights and German-, French-, 
and Italian- speaking individuals; Belgium, a country with two main linguistic regions 
(Flanders and Walloonia); and Spain, a nation of regions with strong ethnic identities (the 
Basque country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Navarre).  
 
Culture and Institutions   4
Because the potential influence of culture on cooperation, solidarity, or tax morale is 
central to the issue of tax compliance, our study aims to isolate it in a cross-sectional analysis 
of individuals living in specific geographic regions. Nonetheless, defining culture can be 
problematic. One view of it as “the ideas, values, beliefs, behavioral strategies, perceptual 
models and organizational structures that reside in individual brains, and can be learned by 
other individuals through imitation, observation (plus inference), interaction, discussion 
and/or teaching” presents it as a type of language, based on rule systems like ideas, values, 
and external and internal institutions (e.g., customs and conventions)  (Henrich et al., 1999:2). 
Alternatively, culture can be viewed “as a ‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-
views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems,”  
a symbolic vehicle of meaning that includes not only “beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and 
ceremonies” but also “informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals 
of daily life” (Swidler, 1986:273).  
How, then, do norms of compliance originate? Sociology stresses that norms are learned 
through social interaction with others (Williams, 1968; Blau, 1964). Specifically, norm-
conforming behavior results from institutionalization and internalization of norms, but it also 
emerges in social life to reduce insecurity and enhance stability (Opp, 1979). Consequently, a 
common culture produces predictability and an orderly evolution of corresponding institutions 
because shared values act as a filter and the “cohesive cement for the evolving internal rules 
of society” (Kasper and Streit, 1999:393). Thus, culture transmission may solve the 
cooperation problem by building a mechanism similar to conformism to maintain common 
behavior and thus cooperation (Henrich et al., 1999). On the other hand, it also limits choice 
sets. This restrictive influence of culture on individual probability sets implies it might also 
influence tax morale.  
Even though culture studies are relatively new to the tax compliance literature, the topic 
has been extensively investigated in anthropology and sociology (e.g., Tyler, 1871/1924;   5
Herskovits and Willey, 1923; Willey, 1929; Ogburn, 1937; Swidler, 1986; Yengoyan, 1986; 
Wuthnow and Witten, 1988), as well as in political science, which has strongly intensified its 
investigation (e.g., Banfield, 1958; Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam et al., 1983; Wildavsky, 
1985, 1987; Inglehart, 1988; Berezin, 1997; Wedeen, 2002). Inglehart (1988) criticizes that 
cultural factors have been de-emphasized in the rational choice models. Moreover, the 
conceptual framework and empirical methodology of the historical and comparative 
institutional analysis has provided interesting insights into the role of culture in the emergence 
and perpetuation of institutional and organizational trajectories (Greif, 1998). Thus, cultural 
studies “have been animating academic debates, encouraging interdisciplinary exchanges, and 
inspiring battles over the methods, evidence, and goals of scholarly research” (Wedeen, 
2002:713) and have been emphasizing the importance of how cultural elements constrain or 
facilitate patterns of actions and interact with social structure (Swidler, 1986). In addition, the 
social capital literature has shown that socially held beliefs can shape not only collective 
actions but government and economic performance (North 1981; Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Landes, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Putnam, 1993). Indeed, La Porta et al. (1999:223) argued 
that some “societies are so intolerant or distrustful that their governments simply cannot 
function effectively.”  
The extant compliance literature has focused primarily on cross-country studies using 
experimental methodology that has the advantage of holding tax-reporting factors constant to 
better isolate possible cultural differences. Such experiments comparing tax reporting in South 
Africa and Botswana showed that compliance rates vary between states (Cummings et al., 
2005).
1  An experimental comparison of Spain and the United States found differences in the 
level of and the change in compliance, using same experimental settings (Alm, Sanchez, and 
De Juan, 1995).
2 A similar comparison of Switzerland and Costa Rica identified significant 
                                                 
1 These results were supported using additionally survey data. 
2 Alm and Torgler (2006) found similar results using survey evidence.   6
differences between the countries (Torgler and Schaltegger, 2005). Other compliance studies 
have been based on survey data.  For example, Weck (1983) and Weck, Pommerehne, and 
Frey (1984) used cross-country survey results for the years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1978 
to develop an aggregate, country-level “tax immorality” index for several, mostly European, 
countries. Their results indicate that Romanic countries such as France, Italy, and Spain have 
a higher tax immorality than most other countries studied.
3 Kirchgässner (1999) argued that 
these results can be explained by state and religious authority being held mostly by one person 
in the northern states of Europe—making offenses against the state religious offenses also and 
therefore a sin, in contrast to dispersed authority in the majority of Catholic countries to the 
south. These differences between the northern and southern part of Europe are also consistent 
with previous findings focused on social capital (see, e.g., Inglehart, 1988). In a comparison 
of the tax morale of East and West German inhabitants following reunification (based on 
World Values Survey data for 1990 and 1997), Torgler (2003b) found significant differences 
that seemed to be eroded over time. Experiments in behavioral economics have produced 
similarly but mixed results,  which indicate the difficulty of isolating cultural relevance and 
the need to work both empirically and experimentally to provide a broader picture (see Alm 
and Torgler, 2006). Focusing on cultural and institutional differences within—rather than 
between—countries should better isolate the impact of such determinants on tax morale 
because many aspects can be held constant. Thus, for example, if language acts as a restriction 
on individual probability sets, it may also influence individual attitudes toward paying taxes.  
Culture is embedded in the existing institutional complex, which, as Greif (1998:82) 
pointed out, “is not a static optimal response to economic needs, [but rather] a reflection of an  
                                                 
3 These results were confirmed by Alm and Torgler (2006), who extended the previous studies 
using a broader dataset for a multivariate analysis of differences between Romanic and 
Northern European countries.   7
historical process in which past economic, political, social, and cultural features interrelate 
and have a lasting impact on the nature and economic implications of a society’s 
institutions.”
4 For example, in Switzerland, the more directly democratic institutions are in the 
German-speaking region and the lesser in the Latin areas. Therefore, for the Swiss data, we 
control for both direct democracy and cultural regions. It can be argued that institutional rights 
of political participation, which vary strongly between the 26 Swiss cantons, have a strong 
impact on tax morale. Thus, we predict that direct democracy will have a strong impact on tax 
morale. In directly democratic cantons, voters can influence tax law either directly or 
indirectly. That is, exchanging arguments face to face in pre-election discussion  raises 
participants’ information levels (Bohnet and Frey, 1994) and allows them to identify others’ 
preferences. Moreover, such active involvement helps taxpayers better monitor and control 
politicians and thus reduces the asymmetric information between them and their agents 
(government), which also reduces discretionary power. For example, Frey (2001) emphasized 
the importance of the classe politique’s inability to block referenda, which constitutes a strong 
restriction against politicians or the legislature acting in their own interests (Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2000). Specifically, because Swiss taxpayers, who are on average outside the 
group of politicians, can participate in the political process, referenda give them decisional 
power (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Thus, it can be hypothesized that under these conditions, tax 
revenues will be spent more in accordance with taxpayer preference, which in turn increases 
tax morale. In contrast, initiatives make taxpayers the “agenda setters” (Feld and 
                                                 
4 The causality between culture and institutional or social structures is difficult to identify. For 
example, Inglehart (1988:1204) asked whether “southern Europe [has] low levels of trust 
because it has not yet developed modern organizational structures” or whether its later 
industrialization and development of “modern organizational structures” resulted “because its 
traditional culture was relatively low on interpersonal trust.” 
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Kirchgässner, 2000) by helping them express their preferences on tax fund disposition. On the 
other hand, a lack of taxpayer participation may lead to a lower level of satisfaction with the 
system and a feeling of powerlessness, which may lower tax compliance (Alm, Jackson, and 
McKee, 1993). Overall, as amply demonstrated by Tyler’s (1990a,b, 1997) work on the 
importance of legitimacy and allegiance to authority for compliance decisions, rules 
developed through active citizen involvement enhance obedience and willingness to cooperate 
with such legislation. In other words, the more involved citizens are in establishing the rules, 
the stronger their sense of obligation. 
 
Political Attitudes and Religiosity 
Because political attitudes and religiosity can also affect tax morale, our study includes as 
variables trust in state institutions,
5 national pride,
6 and pro-democratic attitudes.
7 Trust in the 
state is examined by relating trust in government, parliament, and the legal system to tax 
morale. Positive actions by the state are intended to increase positive taxpayer attitudes and 
commitment to the tax system and tax payment, and thus compliant behavior (see, e.g., Smith 
and Stalans, 1991; Smith, 1992). Thus, if government acts trustworthily, taxpayers may be 
more willing to comply with tax laws. On the other hand, perceived unfairness increases the 
                                                 
5 Corresponding question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the 
government in your capital/parliament/legal system: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot 
of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1= none at all).  
6  Corresponding question: How proud are you to be …….? (participant nationality), (1= not 
at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud).  
7 Corresponding question: Would you say having a democratic political system is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country? (4 = very good to 1 = very 
bad). 
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incentive to act against tax laws because psychological costs are reduced. Therefore, the 
relationship between taxpayers and government can be seen as a relational or psychological 
contract, which involves strong emotional ties and loyalties. From this perspective, taxes are a 
price paid for government actions and maintenance of a fair legal system. In sum, if taxpayers 
trust state’s institutions, they are more willing to be honest.  
A further aspect is the widespread phenomenon of national pride, whose effect on tax 
cheating and other aspects of compliance appears to have been little documented in the 
literature to date: ‘The dynamics [that] govern the creation, destruction, and distribution of 
various forms of pride and shame in society are very little understood, yet nothing perhaps is 
more crucial to the understanding of the overall dynamics of a particular society than the 
marked differences which exist among societies in this regard” (Boulding, 1992:93). The sense 
of group identification produced by national pride encourages cooperative behavior and 
thereby influences citizen behavior in groups, organizations, and societies (Tyler, 2000). Thus, 
the greater the national pride, the higher the tax morale might be.  
Because religion can be seen as a proxy for such characteristics as work ethic, tolerance, 
and trust (La Porta et al., 1999), it acts as a sanctioning system that legitimizes and reinforces 
social values and may also inhibit illegal behavior (Hirschi and Stark, 1969). Religious 
organizations thus provide moral social constitutions and, to a certain extent, act as 
“supernatural police” that enforce accepted rules (Anderson and Tollison, 1992).  Moreover, 
the relative costs for religious inputs to produce social goods are quite low, although the 
demand side is influenced by cultural complexity (Hull and Bold, 1994). For example, 
individuals in complex communities are less able to recognize the social costs of misbehavior, 
so the individual gain from proper behavior is lower than in smaller societal groups. Thus, 
religion has a comparative advantage in producing or encouraging social goods in large 
cultures of intermediate complexity whose central government is too weak to enforce property 
rights (Hull and Bold, 1994). Indeed, some criminology studies have found a negative   10
correlation between religious membership and crime (see, e.g., Hull and Bold, 1989; Lipford, 
McCormick, and Tollison, 1993; Hull, 2000). Thus, because religiosity seemingly affects the 
degree of rule breaking, we assume it can be a restriction on tax evasion.  However, rather 
than asking the degree of religiosity directly, we include religiosity proxied by frequency of 
church attendance,
8 which approximates how much time individuals devote to religion, an 
aspect that traditional research has so far neglected (Iannaccone, 2002). 
 
Empirical Model  
The many factors encompassed by the World Values Survey (WVS, 1990–1993 and 
1995–1999) and the European Values Survey (EVS, 1999–2000) facilitate isolation of the 
influence of formal and informal institutions. Thus, besides integrating personality and 
demographic factors into a multiple regression analysis, we measure individual attitudes 
toward tax paying by asking whether cheating if the chance arises is always justified, never 
justified, or something in between. The responses are used to produce a 10-scale index of tax 
morale with the extreme points ”never justifiable” (10) and “always justifiable” (1).  To take 
into account the ranking of this scaled dependent variable, we use an ordered probit model.  
Moreover, the high number of responses in all three surveys that cheating on taxes is never 
justifiable suggests a natural cut-off point at value 10. Thus, we also report the findings of a 
probit model in which our tax morale variable takes the value 1 for a response that cheating on 
taxes is “never justified” and zero otherwise.
9  
                                                 
8 Corresponding question: Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often 
do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a 
month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more 
than once a week to 1 = never or practically never). 
9 We also conducted estimations in which the 10-point scale was recoded first into a 4-point 
scale (0,1,2,3), with the value 3 standing for “never justifiable.” However, because of a lack of   11
Of course, the measurement of tax morale is not free of bias. First, because the available 
data are based on self-reports in which subjects tend to overstate their degree of compliance 
(Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998), no objective or observable measure of tax morale is 
available. Moreover, Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing (1987) found strong differences between 
actual evasion assessed and evasion reported in survey responses. Nonetheless, because the 
way we define tax morale is less sensitive than asking whether a person has evaded taxes, we 
expect the degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, the dataset is based on wide-ranging 
surveys, which reduces the probability of respondent suspicion and the framing effects of 
other tax context questions. It can still be argued, however, that a taxpayer who has evaded in 
the past will tend to excuse this kind of behavior and report a higher tax morale in the survey.  
In general, the use of such a single question has the advantage of reducing problems of 
index construction complexity, especially as regards measurement procedure or low 
correlation between items. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that tax morale is a 
multidimensional concept that requires a multi-item measurement tool and the likelihood of a 
multi-item index being adversely affected by random errors will produce more reliable 
measures. However, several previous studies have found consistent results using single-item 
survey measurements and laboratory experiments (e.g., Cummings et al., 2005; Alm and 
Torgler, 2006).  
Our model takes the following structure: 
i i i i
i i i i i
ECON DEM TS
REL PATT INST CULT TM
ε β β β
β β β β β
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0  
Besides the primary independent variables already discussed—culture (CULTi), institutions 
(INSTi), political attitudes (PATTi), and religiosity (RELi)—we include properties of the tax 
system (TSi) as measured by individual tax rate, audit probability, and fine rate (the latter two 
                                                                                                                                                         
variance, units 4–10 were then integrated into value 0. The main results, however, remained 
robust.    12
variables only for Switzerland
10), and economic variables (ECONi).
11 In addition, because 
predicting the effects of deterrence factors on tax morale is difficult; we integrate deterrence 
factors based on the assumption that tax morale is a good indicator of tax compliance. For 
example, many empirical and experimental studies have indicated that higher audit and fine 
rates lead to greater compliance (for an overview, see Alm, 1999; Torgler, 2002),
12 and 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) showed that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated 
with the probability of detection and degree of punishment. However, only the Swiss data 
allowed inclusion of deterrence variables in our observation of cantonal differences. 
Moreover, theoretically assessing the effects of tax rate and income on tax evasion is 
problematic because of its dependence on individual risk preference and the progression of the 
income tax schedule (see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998). Specifically, a higher 
marginal tax rate makes tax evasion marginally more profitable, but taxpayer risk aversion 
can produce a contrary effect influenced by the tax schedule type (e.g., proportional, 
progressive, or regressive) (Frey and Feld, 2002). Moreover, the relationship between tax 
evasion and tax rate depends also on the penalty structure (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; 
                                                 
10 Only the Swiss data allowed deterrence variables to be controlled based on sufficient 
degrees of freedom at the cantonal level.  
11 Class status: dummy variables; income: continuous variable (alternative, scale from 1 to 10 
in the national currency); financial satisfaction: continuous variable (scale from 1 to 10), see 
Inglehart et al. (2000) and European Values Study (1999). 
12 Deterrence imposed by the tax authority might crowd out taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to 
pay their taxes and thus crowd out tax morale. On the other hand, deterrence factors might 
prevent taxpayers with low tax morale from exploiting the more honest taxpayers. Tax morale 
is therefore not expected to be crowded out if the honest taxpayers perceive the stricter policy 
to be directed against dishonest taxpayers (see Frey, 1997).   13
Yitzhaki, 1974). Another variable we consider is financial dissatisfaction,
13 which may create 
a sense of distress, especially when taxes must be paid but a discrepancy exists between the 
actual and the desired financial situation. In such cases, taxes might be perceived as a strong 
restriction, thereby increasing the incentives for reduced tax honesty.  
In addition, we control for demographic factors such as age, gender, education (continuous 
variable, scale between 1 and 8 and 1 and 10 depending on the country), and marital and 
employment status (dummy variables). As regards age, we assume that older people who have 
acquired more social capital (Tittle, 1980) may feel a stronger attachment to the community, 
which might in turn induce additional restrictions that lead to a positive correlation between 
age and tax morale (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996). The resulting stronger 
dependency on others’ reactions may impose higher potential (social) costs of sanctions. 
Moreover, not only has social psychological research suggested that women are more 
compliant and less self-reliant than men (e.g., Tittle, 1980), but research findings in the past 
decade have shown that gender may influence tax compliance (Vogel, 1974; Spicer and 
Becker, 1980; Tittle, 1980; Spicer and Hero, 1985; Baldry, 1987). In addition, more educated 
individuals, who tend to have greater knowledge of tax law and fiscal connections, are more 
aware of state-provided benefits and services than uneducated taxpayers. However, besides 
being potentially more critical of state actions, especially tax revenue expenditures, they may 
also have a better understanding of the opportunities for evasion and avoidance, which 
negatively influences tax morale. Moreover, because marital status may influence legal or 
illegal behavior depending on the extent to which individuals are constrained by their social 
networks (Tittle, 1980) and it can be seen as a proxy for individual risk perception. Finally, as 
regards the effect of employment status on tax morale, the tax compliance literature presents a 
strong argument that self-employed persons have higher compliance costs than employees 
                                                 
13 Corresponding question: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your 
household? (1 = dissatisfied to 10 = satisfied).   14
(e.g., Lewis, 1982). Thus, taxes are more visible for the self-employed, who have a higher 
opportunity to evade or avoid them. However, some professions—including doctors, lawyers, 
and accountants—are heavily regulated and have strong underlying moral codes. Moreover, 
pensions of retired individuals are incomes provided or at least heavily regulated by the state, 
so transparency is higher and the control, better (Torgler and Schneider 2006).  
To correct the samples and achieve a true reflection of the national distribution, we use 
weighted ordered probit and weighted probit estimations. Because the equation is nonlinear, 
only the sign, not the size, of the coefficient can be directly interpreted, meaning that the most 
appropriate method for finding the quantitative effect of a variable on tax morale is to calculate 
its marginal effects. Thus, all tables show only the marginal effect for the highest tax morale 
value (“tax evasion is never justified”). It should also be noted that neutral answers (e.g., “don’t 




Analyses of Swiss data are interesting because Switzerland’s institutions and culture are 
not homogeneous; rather, even though major decisions are generally made through direct 
democratic participation (for a survey, see Kobach, 1994), the degree of institutionalized 
political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 Swiss cantons. Thus, this study 
uses a 6-point scale index developed by Frey and Stutzer (2000) that reflects the extent of 
direct democratic participation (1 = lowest and 6 = highest degree of participation).
14 In 
addition, Switzerland is a mosaic of different cultures speaking four languages—German, 
                                                 
14 The index includes four legal instruments: the popular initiative to change the canton’s 
constitution, the popular initiative to change the canton’s law, the compulsory and optional 
referendum to prevent a new law or change a law, and the compulsory or optional referendum 
to prevent new state expenditure (for a detailed discussion, see Stutzer, 1999).    15
French, Italian, and Romansh. Therefore, we build dummy variables based on the language 
spoken during the interview, which, because only Swiss citizens participated, correspond 
mostly to the three main languages (excluding Romansh). However, Swiss cantons differ not 
only with respect to language and rights of direct democracy but also in terms of tax system 
and taxpayer treatment. Such cantonal differences can be controlled for in our empirical 
analysis of the 1996 World Values Survey data.
15 To take such differences into consideration, 
we add into the estimations, fine rates, and audit probability, and individual tax rates; tax 
system properties that must be controlled for if we are to isolate the influence of our main 
independent variables on tax morale. That is, because Swiss citizens can vote on tax issues, 
excluding these variables might confound the effect claimed to reflect direct democratic rights 
with cantonal tax structure.
16 For each canton c, we approximate the probability of detection 
by the number of tax auditors per taxpayer (in ‰) and the penalty tax rate by the standard 
legal fine as a multiple of the evaded tax amount (in percentages).
17 In addition, because it can 
be argued that including our three aggregated cantonal variables—direct democracy, audit 
probability, and fine rate—will produce downwardly biased standard errors (e.g., Frey and 
                                                 
15 However, it should be noted that the Swiss World Values Survey was not random-random 
but quota-random, based first on a random sample of communes and then on quotas for 
demographic variables like sex and age in the selected communes. Thus, the smallest cantons 
(specifically, Appenzell a. Rh., Glarus, Jura, Nidwalden, Uri, and Zug) were not necessarily 
represented.  
16 Calculations are based on the average weighted value (in percentages) using the WVS 
income groups and regional information. The differentiation between singles and married 
people has been included. 
17 Data on the probability of detection and the fine for tax evasion were collected using a 
questionnaire by Lars P. Feld and Bruno S. Frey, who based the following contributions on 
this dataset: Feld and Frey (2002a,b) and Frey and Feld (2002).    16
Stutzer, 2000), we address the problem of heteroscedasticity by presenting standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on cantons.
18  
As Table 1 shows, a one-point increase in the direct democracy index raises the share of 
persons with the highest tax morale between 2.9 and 4.6 percentage points, meaning that a 
higher degree of direct democracy leads to higher tax morale.
19 Calculating the marginal 
effects at the lowest tax morale level, we observe that an increase in the direct democracy 
index by one unit reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is always justified close to 
1 percentage points. The biggest jump can be observed between category 9 and 10.  The 
probit estimations in specifications (4) indicates that an increase in the level of direct 
democracy by one unit raises the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justified by 
2.9 percentage points.  
Because a positive correlation between direct democracy and tax morale might be driven 
by higher trust and national pride, we have included these two variables in specifications (2) 
to (4). Including these variables sequentially in the estimations also reduces possible criticism 
of similarities between them and tax morale as it can be argued that not only national identity 
and trust tap the feelings of legitimacy for the political system but also tax morale.
20  
Whereas, as is apparent, the correlation remains robust, the different culture variables do 
not exhibit a similar profile. Rather, French speakers have a lower, but Italian speakers a 
                                                 
18 The advantage of this class of estimators is that they do not require a precise modelling of 
the heteroscedasticity source. Therefore, they are robust to heteroscedasticity of arbitrary 
form. In general, cluster estimators tend to increase the reported standard errors by a relatively 
large amount, which reduces the levels of statistical significance for the estimated 
coefficients.  
19 The marginal effects even increase when including income instead of economic classes. 
However, such estimations have a higher amount of missing values.  
20 These variables were also included sequentially in the estimations for Belgium and Spain.     17
higher, tax morale than German speakers. Moreover, overall, the results are not fully robust 
because in the probit estimations, the coefficients lose their statistical significance.
21 The role 
of cultural variables can also be investigated using a Wald test for coefficient restriction. The 
chi-squared statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis in all specification, meaning that 
culture plays a significant role in the determination of individual tax morale.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Trust in government also appears to have a significantly positive effect on tax morale with 
high marginal effects. A one-unit increase in the trust in government scale increases the share 
of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by more than 7 percentage points and reduces the 
share of subjects reporting the lowest tax morale by more than 1 percentage point. We also 
investigated the marginal effects when moving form category to category. In many cases the 
marginal effects are around 1 percentage points. Strong jumps are observable at the extremes 
(moving from 9 to 10 or 1 to 2). Moreover, as the findings in Table 1 indicate, a higher national 
pride value tends to lead to higher tax morale. For example, specification (2) reports that an 
increase in the national pride scale by one unit raises the probability of stating that tax evasion 
is never justified by 3.7 percentage points. Also here, we observe strong quantitative jumps at 
the extremes. However, the effect of national pride decreases after the trust variable is included 
in the estimations. Nonetheless, based on a Wald test for joint significance of trust in 
government and national pride, we can conclude that these two variables play a significant role 
in the determination of tax morale. As a group, the variables are jointly significant in all 
estimations at the 1 percent level. Moreover, our findings indicate that religiosity has a 
significantly positive effect on tax morale with marginal effects between 3.2 and 4.2 percentage 
points. Thus, specification (1), for example, reports that an increase in the level of church 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that the positive effect strongly decreases when estimations are 
conducted without controlling for direct democracy.    18
attendance by one unit, raises the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justifiable by 
4.2 percentage points. This result also confirms the relevance of social norms.  
The impact of direct democracy remains robust when we set some of the other variables at 
different levels. For example, for individuals that are not in the upper class, a one unit increase 
in the direct democracy index leads to an increase in the probability of reporting that tax 
evasion is never justified by 3 percentage points. We observe also robust results when 
focusing on subgroups with different kind of trust, national pride and religiosity levels.  
In contrast, the deterrence factors, whose marginal effects are very low, have no strong 
impact on individual attitudes towards paying taxes. Indeed, the coefficient of the fine rate is 
negatively significant in most cases, which indicates that higher punishment crowds out tax 
morale.
22 Individual tax rate and income, which were included sequentially, are missing more 
values than the other control variables. The regression results are not presented in Table 1, but 
indicate that, neither variable has a statistically significant impact on tax morale. All 
estimations also include financial satisfaction, which is shown to have a positive effect on tax 
morale. 
In terms of the other control variables, we observe a tendency for women to report a 
significantly higher level of tax morale than men. Moreover, individuals between 50 and 64 
exhibit higher tax morale than the reference (lowest age) group. In addition, married people 
have higher, albeit not significantly different, tax morale than singles,
23 while part-time 
                                                 
22 However, it can be also argued that perceived deterrence factors (especially the perceived 
probability of detection) may determine tax morale much more strongly than the objective 
measurable factors used in this paper. Scholz and Pinney (1995) found support for the idea 
that the subjective risk of getting caught is more closely related to sense of duty than to 
objective risk factors. However, it was not possible to collect this information in our study.  
23 The coefficient becomes statistically significant when the tax morale variable is coded using 
a four-point scale.    19




Our investigation also examines possible differences among the different (Dutch and 
French) cultural communities in Belgium, which, following independence in 1830, was ruled 
by the Francophone elite. At the end of the nineteenth century, when the Flemish movements 
for cultural autonomy gained importance (van Houten, 1999), the concepts of community and 
region were introduced into the national constitution (Gérard, 2001). One step in building 
Belgian federalism was the introduction in the 1960s of a language boundary, with French in 
the south, Flemish in the north, and Brussels being bilingual. Two decades later, over a 10-
year transition process (until 1999), regions received shares of personal and corporate income 
taxes. However, the tax rates are still set by the federal government and autonomous taxes 
constitute less than 10 percent of the subnational institutional budgets. Moreover, even though 
the new income tax system allows regions to place surcharges or discounts on the federal level 
rates for personal income tax (van Houten, 1999), the regions have not actually made use of 
this advantage. In fact, despite a further broadening of regional power to establish additional 
taxes or rebates (the 2001 Lambermont and Saint-Polycarpe agreements), regions have neither 
modified the tax base or federal tax calculations nor reduced the progressive graduation of tax. 
Therefore, this study integrates the individual marginal tax rates into the regressions, for 
which, in contrast to Switzerland, there are no regional differences.
24 In addition, because 
relatively few values are missing, we include the income variable directly into the 
specifications. As outlined in Table 2, we first present two estimations using culture as the 
main independent variable (see specifications 1 and 4), after which estimations 2 and 3 take 
                                                 
24 Calculations were based on the EVS income groups. The differentiation was between 
singles and couples (an average of 1 or 2 earners).   20
into account the variables pride, trust in parliament, and pro-democratic attitudes. The results 
indicate no statistically significant difference between cultural groups, but some differences 
do exist between the ordered probit and probit estimations. In the probit estimation, the 
Flemish population exhibits lower tax morale than the French-speaking inhabitants (which in 
one instance is statistically significant);
25 however, overall, the difference is not statistically 
significant, which may be due to a lower degree of institutional difference and autonomy 
compared to Switzerland. That is, even though the direction of causality is unclear, 
institutional variations may help cultivate certain cultural differences and a variance in the 
norms of compliance.  
Moreover, instead of trust in government, in this instance, we examine trust in parliament, 
which allows us to analyze the robustness of the impact of trust on tax morale. As in the 
results for Switzerland, national pride and trust have a positive impact on tax morale. A one-
unit increase in the pride scale raises the share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by 
more than 3 percentage points and reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is always 
justifiable by around 1 percentage points. Trust in parliament is also positively correlated with 
tax morale. An increase in the scale by one unit raises the probability of reporting the highest 
tax morale level between 5.8 and 8.6 percentage points and on the other hand reduces the 
probability of stating that tax evasion is always justified by 2.4 percentage points. For both 
variables, national pride and trust in the parliament, the biggest jumps are observable at the 
extremes. The EVS also allows investigation of a further variable—attitude toward 
democracy.
26 As Table 2 shows, pro-democratic attitudes have a highly significant positive 
                                                 
25 An ordered probit estimation using a four-point scale indicated a consistently negative, but 
not statistically significant, coefficient for the variable FLEMISH.  
26 Corresponding question: Would you say that having a democratic political system is a very 
good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country? (1 = very good to 4 = 
very bad).   21
effect on tax morale. A one-unit increase in the pro-democracy scale raises the proportion of 
persons indicating the highest tax morale by 3.2 percentage points in the ordered probit and 
5.8 in the probit estimation. Moreover, church attendance is related to significantly higher tax 
morale in the ordered probit, which is in line with the results for Switzerland.  
We also investigate whether the impact of these main independent variables remain robust 
when analyzing the Flemish and French-speaking population independently. It is interesting to 
note that the impact of the variables national pride and pro-democratic attitudes on tax morale 
is stronger among the French speaking population. 
Also consistent with the findings for Switzerland, the tax rate has no significant impact on 
tax morale. Rather, the economic variables indicate that higher income tends to lead to lower 
tax morale, an impact that is statistically significant in the probit estimation. As regards the 
demographic variables, the particularly high tax morale exhibited by the 50-64 age group 
suggests a positive impact of age. Moreover, women clearly report higher tax morale than 
men, while, based on the statistically significant coefficients in the ordered probit estimations, 
married people tend to have higher tax morale than singles.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Spain 
The Spanish data provide the opportunity to test Moreno’s (2001) claim that Spain lacks a 
single state identity by looking for differences between historical Spanish nationalities. Based 
on the 1978 Spanish Constitution, Spain is now divided into 17 autonomous communities 
(AC), 53 provincial governments, and 8.098 municipalities. Therefore, we use dummy 
variables for the regions with their own cultural identity—namely, the Basque country, 
Navarre, Catalonia, and Galicia—and group the other Spanish regions into a reference group. 
The Basque country and Navarre (both Charter regions) are the two self-governing 
communities whose financial system allows them to regulate and collect their own taxes, even   22
though a certain amount (fixed) of the collected revenue must be transferred to the central 
government. Moreover, despite this higher level of autonomy, separatist tendencies in these 
regions may have a negative impact on willingness to cooperate. In contrast, even though 
Catalonia has a strong sense of identity, separatism is weaker (Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano, 
1998). Galicia, also a historical region with its own language (Gallego) and a strong sense of 
identity, has a similar autonomic status to Catalonia based on Article 151 of the Spanish 
Constitution, which gives this region a high degree of self-rule (Rodriguez-Pose, 2000). 
However, the movement towards more autonomy is weaker in Galicia than in Catalonia 
(Keating, 1999). Indeed, Villadangos (1999) stressed a consensual view of Catalonia, the 
Basque country, and Galicia as separate nationalities.  
This analysis, based on the World Values Survey (1995–1997), uses Spanish data from 
1995, at which time no differences existed between the autonomous communities (in contrast 
to the Charter regions) in the setting of statutory tax rates (Esteller-Moré, 2005). In the 
multivariate analysis for Spain, outlined in Table 3, the Wald test indicates that culture plays a 
significant role in the determination of individual tax morale. It is also apparent that Navarre 
and the Basque country have lower tax morale than the reference group. The probit 
estimations indicate that being from Navarre rather than from the reference group reduces the 
probability of stating that tax evasion is never justified by more than 45 percentage points. 
Taking also a closer look at the ordered probit model reveals that being from Navarre 
increases the probability of reporting that tax evasion is always justifiable by 3 percentage 
points. Thus, the coefficient for Navarre is very robust, showing very high marginal effects, 
whereas the coefficient for Basque loses its significance in both models after the inclusion of 
trust, national pride, and pro-democratic attitudes. Controlling therefore for these factors leads 
to a reduction of cultural differences between the Basque country and the regions in the 
reference group. Interestingly, Moreno (2001) reported results from a periodic survey by the 
newspaper País that showed Basques to have a stronger feeling of self identity than people   23
from other regions; specifically, 23 percent of Basques declared they felt “only Basque.” On 
the other hand, despite a strong sense of identity in Catalonia, separatism is weaker than in the 
Basque country. In Catalonia, for example, only 12.5 of the individuals defined themselves as 
only Catalan. The coefficient is positive showing even a statistical significant impact in the 
second estimation. As the coefficient for Basque was not as robust as expected, it might be 
interesting to investigate tax morale using an earlier World Values Survey wave. To 
investigate what happens between the different tax morale scales, we analyze the World 
Values Survey for 1990 using the four-point scale described previously. The results indicate 
that in the Basque country, tax morale at the lowest level (a score of 0) strongly decreased 
between 1990 and 1995. We observe particularly higher values for tax morale scores of 2 and 
3. In 1995, more than 45 percent of individuals stated that tax evasion is never justifiable, 
compared to around 30 percent in 1990. In a next step, we test whether our different samples 
have the same distribution using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney). Here the 
results indicate a significant difference between 1990 and 1995 for the Basque country, 
meaning that tax morale increased significantly over time in that region. We also observe a 
significantly lower level of tax morale compared to other Spanish regions. In general, this 
intertemporal improvement may be based on observed and planned institutional changes (the 
decentralization process) such as the various reforms during the 1990s that generally 
increased the regions’ autonomy. For example, Law 14/1996 defined regional governments’ 
share in personal income tax as ceded, creating a decreasing degree of their financial 
dependence on central government (Toboso, 2005). This trend can be expected to have also 
affected the Basque country’s tax morale despite its Charter region status.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In general, however, the findings indicate that higher autonomy does not lead to 
significantly higher tax morale, a result that is not in line with the findings for Switzerland.   24
However, compared to Switzerland, the fiscal decentralization process in Spain is still 
unfinished. Moreover, Suárez-Pandiello (1999) argued that decentralization in Spain gives 
little incentive for fiscal co-responsibility.  
As illustrated in Table 3, pride, trust (here, trust in the legal system), and pro- democratic 
attitudes have a significant positive impact on tax morale. The probit estimations indicate that 
an increase in the trust in the legal system scale by one unit, raises the probability of stating 
that tax evasion is never justifiable by more than 4 percentage points. The marginal effects for 
the factors national pride and pro-democratic attitudes are similar. However, contrary to the 
previous findings, church attendance has no such statistically significant impact. The findings 
for the control variables do suggest a tendency for women to be more compliant than men. 
Widowed individuals show the highest tax morale, and part-time employees tend to have 
lower tax morale than full-time workers, but this finding is statistically significant in only one 
estimation. The probit results also relate being upper middle class to the lowest tax morale, 
showing specifically that it reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is never 
justifiable by more than 15 percentage points. We also estimated regression with the marginal 
tax rates, as we observe tax rate differences between the Charter regions and other areas and 
we differentiate between married and unmarried subjects when calculating the marginal tax 
rates based on available income information. The results are not reported as the individual 
marginal tax rates have no impact on attitudes toward paying taxes and the impact of the other 
variables remain robust.  
 
Conclusions 
In contrast to most of the emerging cross-cultural research on tax compliance (e.g., Alm et 
al., 1995; Cummings et al., 2005), this study concentrates on the impact of cultural and 
institutional variation within countries. Thus, it complements previous studies cross-country 
studies that used mainly laboratory experiments expanding the area of cultural and   25
institutional studies by isolating possible cultural and institutional differences within each 
country using survey. For example, as suggested by previous tax compliance research using 
cross-country data, cultural and regional differences do affect tax morale in both Switzerland 
and Spain. Moreover, the finding—robust for all three countries—that trust in the legal 
system, government, and parliament; national pride; and pro-democratic attitudes all have a 
positive effect on tax morale provides evidence that higher legitimacy for political institutions 
leads to higher tax morale.  
At the same time, differences do exist between the three countries studied. Whereas in 
Switzerland direct democracy has a strong impact on tax morale, in Spain more autonomy 
does not necessarily lead to more support for government taxation, possibly because of 
separatist tendencies and an unfinished fiscal decentralization process.  These results support 
the argument that active citizen involvement enhances rule obedience and willingness to 
cooperate.
27 In addition, in Switzerland and Belgium, religiosity appeared to have a robust 
impact on tax morale, but no such statistically significant impact was found for Spain. 
Overall, this investigation of tax morale in three multicultural European countries provides 
new insights into the factors that shape the emergence and maintenance of citizens’ 
willingness to cooperate with tax legislation.  
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TABLE 1 
Tax Morale in Switzerland (WVS 1996) 
 Weighted  Eq. 1     Eq. 2     Eq. 3     Eq. 4    
Clustering on cantons  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Probit    
Variables  Coeff. Marg. Coeff.  Marg. Coeff. Marg.  Coeff.  Marg.
a) Institutional Variable      
DIRECT DEMOCR.  0.116***0.046 0.109*** 0.043 0.104*** 0.041  0.073** 0.029
b) Culture      
ITALIAN 0.293** 0.114 0.218** 0.085 0.204* 0.080  0.176  0.069
FRENCH -0.183 -0.073 -0.178* -0.071 -0.175* -0.069  -0.160  -0.064
c) Pride and Trust      
PRIDE   0.093* 0.037 0.047 0.019  0.069  0.027
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT    0.231*** 0.092  0.191*** 0.076
d) Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.106***0.042 0.103*** 0.041 0.093*** 0.037  0.080*** 0.032
e) Deterrence Factors         
FINE RATE  -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001
AUDIT PROBABILITY  3.00E-041.00E-0.001 3.00E-0.001 3.00E-0.002  0.001
f) Demographic Factors        
AGE 30–49  -0.03 -0.012 -0.059 -0.024 -0.063 -0.025 -0.092  -0.037
AGE 50-–64  0.242 0.095 0.254 0.1 0.248 0.097  0.161  0.064
AGE 65+  0.092 0.036 0.037 0.015 -0.013 -0.005 -0.053  -0.021
WOMAN 0.208***0.083 0.172** 0.068 0.127 0.051  0.078  0.031
EDUCATION -0.011 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.035 -0.014  -0.037  -0.015
g) Marital Status        
MARRIED 0.187 0.074 0.168 0.067 0.218 0.086  0.28  0.111
LIVING TOGETHER -0.145 -0.058 -0.145 -0.058 -0.093 -0.037 -0.13  -0.052
DIVORCED 0.277 0.108 0.241 0.094 0.273 0.106  0.328  0.126
SEPARATED 0.244 0.095 0.254 0.098 0.214 0.083  0.08  0.031
WIDOWED -0.112 -0.044 -0.13 -0.052 -0.09 -0.036  -0.196  -0.078
h) Economic Variable       
UPPER CLASS  0.013 0.005 -0.239 -0.095 -0.305 -0.121 -0.382  -0.151
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.2  -0.08 -0.421 -0.166 -0.471 -0.186 -0.681** -0.266
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.086 -0.034 -0.276 -0.11 -0.309 -0.123 -0.471  -0.186
WORKING CLASS  -0.107 -0.043 -0.332 -0.132 -0.33 -0.131 -0.531*  -0.209
FINAN. SATISFACTION  0.046** 0.018 0.043** 0.017 0.036* 0.014 0.056** 0.022
i) Employment Status        
PART-TIME EMPLOYED  0.196 0.077 0.272* 0.106 0.276* 0.107  0.243  0.095
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.116 0.046 0.185 0.072 0.139 0.055  0.015  0.006
UNEMPLOYED 0.239 0.093 0.122 0.048 0.113 0.044  0.399  0.151
AT HOME  0.374** 0.144 0.39 0.15 0.386** 0.149  0.384*  0.147
STUDENT 0.094 0.037 0.151 0.059 0.07 0.028  -0.169  -0.067
RETIRED 0.656 0.245 0.678** 0.252 0.684** 0.254  0.653  0.243
OTHER 0.178 0.07 0.19 0.074 0.28 0.108  0.564  0.207
Wald-Test: Culture  30.57*** 17.51*** 13.72***    5.71* 
Wald-Test: Dem. & Culture  39.58*** 28.77*** 30.62***    8.02** 
Wald-Test: Trust and Pride    51.25    14.48***
Pseudo R
2 0.053 0.055 0.061     0.113 
Number of Observations  1070 1010 980    980 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000     0.000 
Notes: Ordered probit: tax morale on a 10-point scale (10 = cheating on tax is never justifiable). 
Probit estimation: 1 = cheating on tax is never justifiable. Characteristics of reference group: AGE 
18–29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, LOWER CLASS, GERMAN SPEAKING. 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect in the ordered 
probit estimations (highest tax morale = 10). Variables at the cantonal level: DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY, FINE RATE, and AUDIT PROBABILITY.  
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TABLE 2 
Tax Morale in Belgium (EVS 1999) 
   Eq. 1     Eq. 2     Eq. 3     Eq. 4    
Weighted  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Probit     Probit    
Variables  Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.  Coeff. Marg.
a) Culture Variables             
FLEMISH 0.014  0.005  0.066  0.025 -0.143*  -0.055  -0.051  -0.019
b) Pride, Trust, Democracy                 
PRIDE       0.087*  0.033       0.091*  0.034 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT      0.228***  0.086       0.155***  0.058 
PRO DEMOCRACY       0.085*  0.032       0.154**  0.058 
c) Religious Variable             
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE  0.035*** 0.013 0.031**  0.012 0.014  0.005 0.007  0.002 
d) Tax Rate                         
INDIV. MARG. TAX 
RATE  0.001  0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.007  0.003 0.005  0.002 
e) Demographic Factors                     
AGE  30–49  0.178*  0.068  0.169 0.064  0.206 0.078  0.103 0.039 
AGE  50–64  0.215*  0.083 0.251*  0.096 0.22  0.085 0.205  0.078 
AGE  65+  0.148 0.057  0.113 0.043  0.189 0.073  0.073 0.028 
WOMAN  0.274*** 0.104 0.300*** 0.113 0.234*** 0.089 0.230**  0.086 
EDUCATION  0.025  0.009  -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002  -0.042 -0.016
f) Marital Status                     
MARRIED  0.223*  0.084 0.218*  0.081 0.235  0.088 0.224  0.083 
DIVORCED  -0.063  -0.024 -0.014  -0.005 0.072 0.027  0.191 0.074 
SEPARATED -0.359*  -0.127 -0.395*  -0.136 -0.542* -0.181  -0.541  -0.179
WIDOWED  0.114  0.044 0.03  0.011 0.094  0.036 0.056  0.021 
g) Economic Variables                     
INCOME -0.042  -0.016 -0.045  -0.017 -0.065**  -0.025  -0.060*  -0.023
h) Employment Status                     
PART-TIME       
EMPLOYED  -0.127 -0.047 -0.106 -0.039 -0.199 -0.073  -0.18  -0.066
SELF-EMPLOYED  -0.228*  -0.083 -0.194  -0.07 -0.398** -0.14 -0.318  -0.113
UNEMPLOYED  -0.024 -0.009 -0.099 -0.037 0.009  0.003  -0.096 -0.036
AT  HOME  -0.103 -0.039 -0.111 -0.041 -0.026 -0.01  0.002  0.001 
STUDENT  0.072  0.028  0.115  0.044  -0.022 -0.008  -0.078 -0.029
RETIRED  0.293**  0.113 0.245*  0.094 0.352**  0.136 0.332**  0.127 
OTHER  0.456**  0.18  0.455* 0.179  0.420* 0.165  0.500* 0.196 
Wald-Test: Trust, Pride; Pro-
Democracy       32.17***          20.43***    
Wald-Test: Trust, Pride; Pro- 
Democracy, Culture       32.29***          22.63***    
Pseudo R
2  0.020     0.028     0.054     0.068    
Number of Observations  1444     1161     1444     1161    
Prob > χ2  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
Notes: Dependent variable: ordered probit: tax morale on a ten-point scale (1 to 10, 10=cheating on tax 
is never justifiable). Probit estimation: 1= cheating on tax is never justifiable. Characteristics of 
reference group: AGE 15–29, MAN, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, WORKER, and 
WALLOON. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect in 
the ordered probit estimations (highest tax morale = 10). 
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TABLE 3 
Tax Morale in Spain (WVS 1995) 
   Eq. 1     Eq. 2     Eq. 3     Eq. 4    
   Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Probit     Probit    
Variables  Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.  Coeff.  Marg. 
a) Culture Variables              
BASQUE -0.328***-0.121-0.098  -0.035-0.592***-0.225  -0.299  -0.109 
CATALAN  0.106 0.036 0.218**  0.072 0.071 0.024  0.166  0.055 
GALICIA  -0.012 -0.004-0.075 -0.026-0.023 -0.008  -0.080  -0.028 
NAVARRE -0.711***-0.274-0.630***-0.241-1.267***-0.472  -1.201***  -0.451 
b) Pride, Trust and Democr.              
PRIDE     0.111*  0.038    0.125**  0.043 
TRUST IN LEG. SYSTEM      0.120** 0.041     0.121**  0.042 
PRO  DEMOCRACY     0.199*** 0.069    0.158**  0.054 
c) Religious Variable              
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE  0.021 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.024 0.008  0.011  0.004 
d) Demographic Factors                     
AGE  30–49  -0.012 -0.004-0.045 -0.015-0.11  -0.039  -0.142  -0.05 
AGE 50–64  0.077  0.026 -0.03  -0.011-0.055  -0.019  -0.156  -0.055 
AGE  65+  0.187 0.063 0.027 0.009 0.06  0.021  -0.119  -0.042 
WOMAN 0.158*  0.055 0.218**  0.075 0.157  0.054  0.199*  0.069 
EDUCATION  -0.009 -0.003-0.022 -0.008-0.014 -0.005  -0.024  -0.008 
e) Marital Status                     
MARRIED  0.132 0.046 0.127 0.044 0.096 0.034  0.096  0.033 
LIVING  TOGETHER  0.002 0.001 -0.046  -0.0160.279 0.09 0.265  0.085 
DIVORCED  -0.027 -0.01  -0.098 -0.035-0.1  -0.036  -0.18  -0.065 
SEPARATED 0.1  0.034 0.173  0.057 0.051 0.018  0.167  0.055 
WIDOWED  0.354  0.112 0.417* 0.128 0.396* 0.123 0.466*  0.14 
f) Employment Status                     
PART-TIME  EMPLOYED  -0.112  -0.04  -0.27 -0.098-0.09 -0.032  -0.201 -0.072 
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.028  0.01  -0.008  -0.0030.077 0.026  0.103  0.035 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.076 -0.027-0.126 -0.044-0.126 -0.045  -0.125  -0.044 
AT  HOME  0.072 0.025 -0.04 -0.0140.011 0.004  -0.06  -0.021 
STUDENT  0.041  0.014 -0.029 -0.01  -0.077 -0.027  -0.128  -0.045 
RETIRED  -0.148 -0.053-0.163 -0.058-0.152 -0.054  -0.146  -0.051 
g) Economic Situation                     
UPPER  CLASS  -0.658 -0.253-0.587 -0.224-0.607 -0.233  -0.526  -0.199 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.27  -0.098-0.273  -0.098-0.429** -0.159  -0.413*  -0.152 
LOWER  MIDDLE  CLASS -0.082 -0.029-0.095 -0.033-0.178 -0.063  -0.197  -0.07 
WORKING  CLASS  0.062 0.022 0.062 0.021 -0.003  -0.001  0.005  0.002 
FINANCIAL SATISF.  0.024  0.008 0.025 0.009 0.02  0.007  0.02  0.007 
Wald-Test: Culture  26.23***   22.05***   24.62***   17.31***   
Wald-Test: Trust, Pride; Pro- 
Democracy 
     21.56***         16.60***    
Pseudo R
2  0.021     0.031     0.049     0.058    
Number of Observations  1102     1004     1102     1004    
Prob > χ2  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
Notes: Dependent variable: ordered probit: tax morale on a 10-point scale (10 = cheating on tax is never 
justifiable). Probit estimation: 1 = cheating on tax is never justifiable. Characteristics of reference group: 
AGE 16–29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, WORKING CLASS, and OTHER SPANISH 
REGIONS. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect in the 
ordered probit estimations (highest tax morale = 10).  ARBEITSPAPIERE  1991-2006 
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